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In my last post following the ethnomusicology debate at City University, I gave links 
to two responses to the event, and also to the position statement by Laudan 
Nooshin [ADDENDUM: see also the position statement by Michael Spitzer). I will 
post a more detailed reply to this latter soon, believing it to be disingenuous in various 
ways and in others to confirm a lot of what I was arguing. But here I just wanted to 
post a longer section from one text cited briefly by Nooshin, J.P.E. Harper-Scott’s The 
Quilting Points of Musical Modernism: Revolution, Reaction, and William 
Walton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). Here I should not hide the 
fact that Paul Harper-Scott is a friend and someone with whom I have had many 
discussions about these types of issues, as I have with many other musicologists and 
others. A good deal of Harper-Scott’s work entails revisionist views of composers and 
aspects of nineteenth- and twentieth-century history, from a perspective broadly 
sympathetic to a modernist aesthetic and firmly opposed to the values of late 
capitalism, from which context he can re-assess figures such as Elgar and Walton, 
never merely in an over-generalised fashion, but backed up by analytical 
detail. Quilting Points is a remarkable book with an ambitious scope; I certainly 
do have some reservations, not least the employment of aspects of Freudian 
psychoanalysis (a discipline for which I have little time), and some other theorists 
about whom I have serious doubts, but it is endlessly stimulating and also extremely 
clearly written, with incisive points springing out from almost every page. Harper-
Scott, as a real expert on the music on which he writes, can move from musical detail 
to social and political context extraordinarily convincingly without relying merely on 
vague allusions, in a manner which I think many of those whose work I have 
criticised in my earlier piece would do well to study. 
 
This book is one of the very few which includes a critique of ethnomusicology from 
an ‘outsider”s position (i.e. one who does not identify as an ethnomusicologist), and I 
value it especially for that reason. For too long ethnomusicology has sought to present 
itself as a self-regulating enterprise (often, in my experience, in a jealously defensive 
fashion), and the lack of proper external scrutiny and critique has in my view enabled 
some very poor work to sail through PhD examination, peer review, and so on,when 
ratified by those with an obvious vested interest in so doing. This passage in Harper-
Scott’s book is part of a wider critique of various recent Anglophone musicological 
trends (not least the ‘new musicology’ and the work of Richard Taruskin), many of 
which he links to a xenophobic Anglo-American variety of late capitalism. I want to 
quote in full the section ‘Ethnomusicology and pop musicology as class enemies’. 
This I found very impressive, not least because of my own long-term disdain for 
Western intellectuals’ romanticising and idealising of massively unequal and 
reactionary social and cultural practices just because they happen to be in the third 
world (a legacy of Maoism, an ideology which enforces a conformity to romantic 
ideals in murderous fashion), an issue touched upon in the commentary by Ben 
Smith on the debate, and which lies at the heart of a remarkable book I have recently 
been reading, Leigh Phillips’ Austerity Ecology and the Collapse-Porn Addicts: A 
Defence of Growth, Progress, Industry and Stuff (Winchester: Zero Books, 2014). 
I was also deeply drawn to Harper-Scott’s description of his own class background 
and readiness to entertain the possibility that a good deal of the liberal grandstanding 
to be found amongst ethnomusicologists, popular music scholars and new 
musicologists primarily relates to a conscience-soothing exercise for sons and 
daughters of privilege feeling a bit guilty for that very reason (just as the Indian 
Marxist writer Aijaz Ahmad has pointed out how the narrative bequeathed by Edward 
Said suits the interests of the sons and daughters of the ruling classes in formerly 
colonised nations, for they definitely need a narrative which takes class out of the 
equation – see the bottom of this post for the passage in question). I come from a 
background not so different to Harper-Scott (indeed today our parents live less than a 
mile from each other in Hartlepool, though are not personally acquainted). I grew up 
in West Park, Hartlepool, to a reasonably comfortable family, though the 
circumstances in which my parents themselves grew up were very different – my 
father was born into deep poverty in 1931, and during the Depression he and his 
family would be moving house every three months or so in a desperate trek for work; 
his father found some construction on a huge cooling tower together with a friend 
during this time and through inappropriate safety regulations watched his friend 
plunge to his death. Both parents left school at 16; I was the first in this strand of the 
family to go to university (both my younger sister and I went to Oxford), which 
naturally was a source of great pride. I learned about music and much else in large 
measure through the resources available at my local library, before going to music 
school at age 10. My background is far from typical for a musician (even less typical 
today than it was in some of the post-war era in the UK), and I have had to fight for it 
in the face of snobbery and privilege. As such, I feel nothing other than total and utter 
contempt for the patronising nonsense presented by academics, including some 
sociologists and ethnomusicologists, who would have denied either Harper-Scott or 
me the chances we had, by trying to make musical education more ‘relevant’ and 
‘inclusive’. One of my greatest joys is when I am able to introduce students of all 
types of background to many types of music, literature, visual arts, complex ideas, 
and so on, which they would have been unlikely to encounter otherwise (and will be 
unlikely to in many university departments if some have their way), and to hear their 
own individual responses (often very different from my own), and help them gain 
tools for developing and framing these ideas – and also push them to read and listen 
widely! – such as facilitates critical perspectives which are based upon detail and real 
knowledge rather than generalities and stereotypes. In short I want them to have the 
opportunities I had; this is one of my main reasons for wanting to teach in a 
university, and I would like to think I achieve this reasonably well. One reason for 
embarking on a critique of some varieties of ethnomusicology (as well as being 
shocked by what passed for scholarship in many cases) is the identification of a group 
of scholars essentially working to deny students much of what I have described, 
instead using them and curricula as vehicles to flatter those very ethnomusicologists, 
under the auspices of spurious rhetoric of diversity and relevance, or turning wider 
deficiencies in British education into virtues. These are worrying trends which can be 
found in many places. 
 
One factor which Harper-Scott identifies very precisely is the limitations of the 
empirical mentality of those people who patronise the lower classes (this is one reason 
why a truly progressive left is in short supply in the empiricist Anglophone world): 
they can only imagine what has been, can be experienced, not what might be, and thus 
to what various members of social groups might aspire. In short, they treat the lower 
classes as another variety of noble savages, just as (as documented in David 
Cannadine’s Ornamentalism: How the British saw their Empire (London: Allen Lane, 
2001)) there is a long history in British society of portraying the poor using similar 
concepts and categories as used to dehumanise colonial subjects of non-Caucasian 
ethnicities. 
 
Harper-Scott also touches on another point, in which context he cites Slavoj Žižek, 
specifically how self-styled Western multiculturalists are happy to tolerate an 
idealised ‘Other’, and ignore an actual ‘Other’ which might not correspond to many of 
their preconceptions. As a sceptic about multiculturalism myself (influenced by the 
thinking of Kenan Malik on this subject), I consider this to be a symptom of an 
ideology – certainly common amongst plenty of ethnomusicologists and 
anthropologists – which fetishes culture (especially local cultures) and is blind to the 
very universal workings of global capitalism and its effects upon peoples and cultures. 
As Terry Eagleton put it in his pungent critique of Gayatri Spivak (Terry Eagleton, 
‘In the Gaudy Supermarket, London Review of Books 21/10 (May 13, 1999), pp. 
3-6): 
 
Much post-colonial writing behaves as though the relations between the North and South of the globe 
were primarily a ‘cultural’ affair, thus allowing literary types to muscle in on rather more weighty 
matters than insect imagery in the later James. Spivak, by contrast, has a proper scorn for such 
‘culturalism’, even if she shares a good many of its assumptions. She does not make the mistake of 
imagining that an essay on the figure of the woman in A Passage to India is inherently more 
threatening to the transnational corporations than an inquiry into Thackeray’s use of the semi-colon. 
The relations between North and South are not primarily about discourse, language or identity but 
about armaments, commodities, exploitation, migrant labour, debt and drugs; and this study boldly 
addresses the economic realities which too many post-colonial critics culturalise away. 
 
A ‘culturalist’ view, on the other hand, can lead to some of the most crazy 
conclusions, such as Germaine Greer’s defence of female genital mutilation, or 
Julia Kristeva’s of Chinese foot-binding, presented as some beguiling alternative 
model of feminine physical demeanour (in Des Chinoises (Paris: Editions 
des femmes, 1974), available in English as About Chinese Women, translated Anita 
Barrows (London: Marion Boyars, 1977)). 
Anyhow, here is ‘Ethnomusicology and pop musicology as class enemies’. Below this 
is a passage from the conclusion from which the quote by Nooshin comes 
(‘According to ethnomusicology, the cultures of the non-western world should take 
intellectual precedence, and those of us who spend our time focusing on Western 
[classical] music should feel ashamed of ourselves (there is quite an irony in the fact 
that ethnomusicology, in the UK at least, increasingly attempts to colonize the 
Western-music syllabuses of our universities’). Nooshin may not ‘recognise the 
ethnomusicology described here and would be interested to know what it is based on’; 
I am sure Harper-Scott could provide plenty of examples, as could I (including some 
of Nooshin’s own work). As regards syllabuses, I wonder how the faculty at the 
School of Oriental and African Studies would feel if they were made to have a few 
Western art music historians/analysts on their faculties, who could then insist that the 
ethnomusicology core curricula must in part be fashioned around their activities and 
specific interests and expertise? But it is important to see this in the wider context of 
the critique presented in the book. 
I would like to encourage others not simply to adhere to my view on this text, but 
submit their own thoughts and responses to this and the wider issues, whatever those 
may be, though keeping such responses focused on the specifics in question and 
refraining from personal attacks. 
  
4.12 Ethnomusicology and pop musicology as class enemies 
‘Henry Stobart’s study of music and potato farming in the Bolivian Andes can be taken as 
representative of this risk as it manifests itself in ethnomusicology.74 It is certainly not representative 
of ethnomusicology as a whole, though there are plenty of other ethnomusicologists like Stobart. Nor is 
the foil I shall use later (some work by Martin Stokes) the only example of an 
alternative ethnomusicological approach. The exact proportion of these kinds of studies in 
ethnomusicology is not germane to the theoretical use I am putting this material, which is to 
demonstrate the possibility for the obscure subject to emerge in this subdiscipline. My arguments may 
be met by one of three arguments academics habitually wheel out when their field is under attack: 
the ‘non-articulation’ argument, the ‘one rogue reporter’ argument, and the ‘you can’t read’ argument. 
The non-articulation argument says that ‘the individual or group you direct your criticisms at is of 
course profoundly aware of the issues you raise, even if they do not articulate them’. I am at a loss to 
see why we are to believe that someone has an articulable understanding of anything, if they do not 
evidence it, particularly when (a) it harms them not to articulate it and (b) there is no bar to them 
articulating it. The only possible reason for remaining silent in such circumstances is that they must be 
consciously deciding, perhaps for reasons of intellectual masochism, to bare themselves to attack – in 
which case they will enjoy what I have to say. The ‘one rogue reporter’ argument (made famous by 
News International in defending charges of phone hacking at its newspapers; it was plausible until 
further evidence revealed the alleged abuses to be more or less systemic) says ‘yes, of course, the target 
you have chosen here is guilty as charged, and if what you say were generally true across the 
subdiscipline then of course I would agree with you – but this individual is alone in doing this, and as a 
whole the subdiscipline is sound’. The answer to this is first that Stobart is certainly not alone, and 
second that even if he were, the existence of even ‘one rogue reporter’ would be sufficient evidence of 
the possibility of the obscure subject presenting itself within ethnomusicology in terms of the formal 
theory I am elaborating in this chapter. The third argument, ‘you can’t read’, which implies that the 
critic fails to understand the subtlety or intellectual context of a position in such a way as to undermine 
their criticism, is the last resort, and requires rather a lot of support if the mud is to stick. But it is at 
least the basis of a meaningful discussion, since it requires the rearticulation of the criticized position 
that explains why the criticism is wrong. I would welcome that. 
In Stobart’s study, non-Western music is not only declared to be interesting, to a sympathetic and 
accustomed Western ear, but – and here a simplistic liberal move that is widespread but not wholly 
permeating in these disciplines shines through – also to evince an essential authenticity in its 
production and consumption that is lost, to our great discredit and disadvantage, in the West (this by 
way of a pseudo-critique of capitalism).75 The tacit contention is that we would all do rather better 
(morally, not intellectually) as musicologists if we turn away from our Eurocentric focus on Beethoven 
and so on. The fractured body of modernist works is therefore denied as a focus for study (¬c) and the 
emancipatory truth claim of modernism is denied (¬ε) and replaced by a new ‘emancipation’ for the 
West’s neglected Other (in this case, the potato farmers of Bolivia). 
Stobart’s essay follows an exemplary democratic-materialist logic. First, six lines into the essay, he 
reminds us that ‘music is not the universal language that many [implicitly bad] people have often 
claimed it to be’, paralleling the logic that ‘there are only bodies and languages’, nothing universal in 
musical experience, but only a multiplicity of musical languages and persons who (re)create and 
experience it: this is true so far as it goes, but banal. Second, in the very next sentence, he declares with 
beautiful capitalist ingenuousness: ‘this does not prevent us deriving great pleasure and inspiration 
from the music of other cultures’.76 This statement has a double edge. On the one hand we are to 
submit to the superego injunction to enjoy this music: and if it sounds unlovely to an unaccustomed 
Western ear, Stobart proves his aretē (and his moral worth) by his capacity to love it.77 But on the 
other hand, the intellectual and material poverty of the farmers whose music this is should inspire us. 
This is the democratic-materialist manifestation of the (ironically!) disavowed Rousseauian ‘noble 
savage’. The authenticity of the Bolivian farmers casts our privileged Western consumerism into 
shameful relief. The paradoxical solution, of course, is for us to buy into the Bolivian culture, by 
visiting, buying CDs of the music, and so on. 
 
The tale Stobart tells of these farmers’ use of music in the different seasons of the potato-growing year 
is unquestionably interesting. ‘The pinkillu flutes and kitarra of the growing season are said to call the 
clouds and rain up from the valleys and to help the crops to grow. In turn the dry 
season wauqu and siku panpipes blow the clouds away causing clear skies and frosts.’78 The 
farmers believe it to be vital that they play the right tunes, because both their diet and their livelihood 
depend utterly on the success of the potato harvest.79 Stobart is careful, early in the essay, to report 
that the connexion between certain instruments and tunes only has a direct climatic effect according to 
the beliefs of the locals, but it is essential to the ideological trajectory of the essay that by the end, all 
the qualifications are removed, and the music does, in all actuality cause the the right weather 
conditions to produce the successful potato harvest. 80 Here is the kernel of the ‘inspiration’ we are to 
draw from the Bolivians: their closeness to their natural world has been lost to us, and it is through 
their musical practices that we see it. We may not return to the subsistence farming they endure 
(though we may dabble in a 1970s, Good Life-style small-holding lifestyle, cultivate an allotment, or 
have grubby-looking organic vegetables delivered from local farmers in weekly boxes), but through 
their music we can approach their perception of the world, and see that ours is neither the only one 
(which is banally true) nor one that we could hope to universalize (which is wrong, as I shall argue, and 
is in fact a quintessential manifestation of the obscure subject). 
I do not for a moment question the need for the West to rethink its relation to nature, and the positive 
component of the Bolivian experience here has a basic appeal (though the need to prevent 
environmental devastation is scarcely a realization that requires the reports from Bolivia to bring it to 
Western attention). But a nastier failing is also present here: the consequences of a refusal to speak 
from a universal moral position.81 One of the dances the farmers perform while they think they are 
aiding the growth of the potatoes involves the circling and ‘trapping’ of the male flute players by a 
group of women. Stobart interprets the symbolism: ‘it would seem that the dancers represent the soil 
or mother earth which protects, but also imprisons and ultimately destroys the parent seed potato when 
it has given birth to the next generation’.82 Considering this comment in the light of Stobart’s final 
words reveals a rich subtext. For my hosts the potato is no mundane staple, but is an enchanting and 
magical being whose life is seen in many ways to parallel and enable their own. Potatoes must be loved 
and cared for, just like human children. This sentiment is expressed through music, song, poetry and 
dance which, in turn, are some of the ultimate expressions of human feeling. For the people of this 
highland hamlet, at least, it would seem that the potato must count among the most important 
organizing principles of musical performance. Or rather, might it be more accurate to say that music is 
one of the primary expressions of the potato?83 
It is easy to itemize the components of this ideological message: 
• subsistence farming is not a burden, a stressful hand-to-mouth existence, but a genuine spiritual 
wonder that rich Westerners might in some ways envy; 
• potatoes are like children, and (implicitly) children are one of the greatest things on earth, and the 
procreation of them is or should be the generic pursuit of all humankind; 
• women, whose role is clarified symbolically in the Bolivian dance, are meant to cultivate and destroy: 
they should as surely be rearing children as the earth produces the potatoes. 
This message of the musical and farming practices of these Bolivians is clearly both anti-feminist and 
pro-natalist in its focus on the reproductive duty of women. And yet, in line with the democratic-
materialist refusal to acknowledge a universal moral position, this is never once questioned in 
Stobart’s essay. I would not accuse him of sympathy with this position, but his intellectual commitment 
here prevents him from raising an objection (this is the mystery of the ‘non-articulation’ argument). 
Not even a disarming remark that this focus on women as mere wombs and (even worse) deadly 
ensnarers and destroyers surfaces in the text, and since by the end of the essay we could be forgiven for 
thinking that the author believes, with his hosts, that the right tunes bring the right weather, Stobart 
forces himself into the invidious position of failing to address the unpalatable parts of the ideology of 
the Bolivian farmers. Are we supposed to tolerate this misogyny merely because it is an expression of 
an Other who we – nasty imperialist Europeans – are morally forbidden to criticize? This is of course 
only a single essay, and in other cases, where the misogyny is even more extreme, we might encounter 
criticism of the Other – but far from demonstrating the consistency of the scholar’s 
multiculturalist position, that of course reveals its Eurocentric basis. Such a critical form of liberal 
democratic materialism 
tolerates the Other in so far as it is not the real Other, but the aseptic Other of premodern ecological 
wisdom, fascinating rites, and so on – the moment one is dealing with the real Other (say, of 
clitoridectomy, of women compelled to wear the veil, of torturing enemies to death . . . ), with the way 
the Other regulates the specificity of its jouissance, tolerance stops. Significantly, the same 
multiculturalists who oppose Eurocentrism also, as a rule, oppose the death penalty, dismissing it as a 
remainder of primitive barbaric customs of vengeance – here, their hidden true Eurocentrism becomes 
visible.84 
Stobart’s silence on the misogyny of the Bolivians is the flip-side of this refusal to tolerate more 
obnoxious prejudices.85 But his message in the study of the potato farmers is also profoundly, and I am 
sure unintentionally, neoliberal in an economic sense, which concerns me even more. Where 
Stobart romanticizes his hosts’ relation to their ‘enchanting and magical’ potatoes, the materialist-
dialectical response is to ask fundamental questions: 
• Must we tolerate a global economic order in which it is possible that people can live in this 
subsistence manner? 
• Can nothing be done to improve the education of these people, to give them proper scientific 
understanding of agriculture, so that they can take proper steps to ensure the success of the potato crop 
on which their entire life depends instead of just playing music and hoping for the best? 
In the face of such an ethnographic study, the materialist-dialectical response could never be: well, 
these people live in this manner, and who am I to judge? The proper response from the Left has to be to 
universalize from its position of economic and material advantage, to look at the appalling 
material conditions of these people and, rather than to cherish and preserve (draw ‘inspiration’ from) 
this way of life, to strive towards the creation of a new world in which it is simply not possible for 
human beings to live in such precarious economic and dietary conditions. Instead of valorizing forms 
of life such as this, the response of ethnomusicologists who undertake fieldwork in these situations 
should be to encourage the rest of the West to make the systemic political changes that are required to 
lift these people out of their situation, to emancipate rather than to romanticize. 
The error in not taking this step is redoubled by the way such relatively rich liberal Westerners use 
their enthusiasm for these appalling ways of life – which is tantamount to complicity in economic 
violence against their various Others – as a stick with which to beat their Leftist counterparts on 
moral grounds. Those Leftists who would like to see the end of these ways of life are of course damned 
for being Eurocentric imperialist monsters. The cause of this purblindness, I suggest, may be the class 
experience of the scholars in question. It appears to some members of the congenital middle classes 
that what the less fortunate majority in their own country or the rest of the world requires is respect and 
tolerance, rather than a means of escape. To suggest that the poor may wish to escape their poverty is, 
on this view, to demean them, when the reality is of course that the way to love the poor best is to stop 
them being poor – in theoretical terms, to break the connexion between their economic situation and 
their subjective existence. It is precisely this connexion that democratic-materialist musicology sets up 
by confusing the situation of people with the people in the situation. 
 
As I noted first in Chapter 1, I speak from a radically different experiential position from virtually any 
academic I know. I used intellect and a set of cultural interests as a means of escape from the doom of 
living out my life in one of the greatest centres of unemployment and poverty in the country, 
the colliery-dominated east coast of County Durham, and from the myriad limitations inbred in a 
family whose education never (before me) progressed beyond the age of 16. I can therefore personally 
corroborate one of Žižek’s more pertinent observations about the tension between (a) the liberal 
bourgeoisie’s essentializing conjoining of the poor with their culture and (b) the equal 
and opposite non-identification of the poor with the material limitations of their existence. Here the 
critique should be broadened back out from ethnomusicology to include also pop musicology, thus 
focusing attention on the principal organs of the obscure subject that attempts to occult the truth claims 
of modernism in music. For just as ethnomusicology can have the unintended effect of commending 
the cultural practices of economically subject external Others, the pop musicologist (or, in other 
disciplines, the scholar of mass-market literature, art, and so on) can make a virtue of the cultural 
practices of the lower social orders, to valorize their educational and economic position and make an 
inextricable link between it and the people who occupy it. The assumption is that since the majority of 
people think and behave in certain ways, they must want to do so, and the duty of the privileged elite is 
therefore to learn to love what the masses love, to hide their privileged cultural forms away. 
What happens in both these cases is that the scholar fails to perceive the fact that the Other is split in 
itself – that members of another culture, far from simply identifying with their customs, can acquire a 
distance towards them and revolt against them – in such cases, reference to the ‘Western’ notion 
of universal human rights can well serve as the catalyst which sets in motion an authentic protest 
against the constraints of one’s own culture.86 
Proof, if it were needed, was again seen in the Arab Spring of 2011, where far from identifying with 
their otherized position (‘Arabs seem naturally disposed towards dictatorships or Islamic 
fundamentalism; we can’t expect them to want our Western democratic values’), the people of Egypt 
and elsewhere rose up against their governments in pursuit of precisely the democratic freedoms and 
human rights that their luckier brothers and sisters in the West enjoy. Here was the universal human 
striving for emancipation, for political freedom, emerging autochthonously from the Other. The 
suffering of the Bolivian farmers, or of children educated in failing comprehensive schools during 
the miners’ strike in County Durham, may be worlds away from the immediately life-threatening 
reality of an attempted revolution, but that does not deprecate them as matters of concern. 
Of course ethnomusicology is not blind to this danger of occultation. Resisting this line of thought from 
within both ethnomusicology and pop musicology are Martin Stokes’s studies of Turkish arabesk, 
popular music from the 1970s onwards whose critique of official nationalist ideology turns 
specifically on questions of identity. In arabesk we find another faithful response to the emancipatory 
truth claims of modernism. Its singers are mostly ‘migrants from a remote and barbarised Turkish 
“orient”, the Arab speaking and Kurdish regions of south east Anatolia, who occupy the urban spaces 
between squatter town and metropolitan centres’; they are also often tranvestites and transexuals.87 Far 
from presenting a uniform and transcendent national Body (C), these internal cultural, economic, and 
sexual Others more properly epitomize the ‘image of an urban lumpen proletariat dislocated and 
alienated through labour migration’.88 The quality of the dissenting voices in this music might be more 
subdued than those of protestors on Tahrir Square – the music ‘calls on listeners to pour another glass 
of raki, light another cigarette, and curse fate and the world’89 – but it is clearly recognizable. This 
dissenting quality led to its condemnation by the Turkish state as ‘foreign’ music, its filigree melodic 
decorations too pan-Arab, the influence of Egyptian film music (Egyptian films were banned in 1948) 
too strong and obvious, its ‘orientalist sophistication in the use of sitars and rhythmic techniques 
learned from Indian tabla playing’ and its melodic dependence on Middle Eastern modal theory 
(makam) both profoundly corrupting, the latter as a remnant of the culturally dangerous pan-Islamic 
civilization that was an external limit for the young Turkish state.90 Perhaps more treacherous still in 
political terms, ‘arabesk has pointed to migration and class issues as lying at the heart of Turkey’s 
social and economic problems’.91 
Arabesk singers neither collapse their identities into one imposed by the official ideology (and 
understood by Westerners to be constitutive of their character as Other) nor, on the other hand, seem to 
proclaim a wholly universal conception of common humanity that would eradicate the particular 
nature of their status as internal Other. In short, arabesk neither over-particularizes nor over-
universalizes, which is what demonstrates its potential as a resurrection of the universal emancipatory 
truth of modernism in the particular world of 1970s–90s Turkish experience. This move, essential to 
maintain the focus on the (disavowed) rift in all human societies, is possible only when scholars refuse 
to too closely identify people with a particular cultural identity; the alternative is to give the mythical 
impression of unity which is essential to the ‘all in this together’ ideology of the economic slash-and-
burn policies dreamt up by the ruling elite in response to the international capitalist crisis of 
2008 onwards. 
Where that move is lacking in studies of popular and non-Western music, we therefore witness the 
declaration of a transcendent body, C, a body of uniformly ‘national’ or at least communal music 
whose practitioners uniformly compose that body (a body which is both complete and different from 
us, and cannot be admitted to the general, universal, fractured body, c). The Turkish state broadcasting 
organization, TRT, proposes just such a ‘transcendence through the characterisation of regional 
difference in terms of a centralised style of musical performance emphasising the role of 
the bağlama (a longnecked lute) orchestra, “correct” Turkish pronunciation and vocal 
techniques associated with the microphone and recording studio rather than unamplified singing’, and 
so on.92 This appeal to transcendence is just one form of the democratic-materialist insistence that no 
universalist position may be taken in the face of a legion of (equally transcendent) Others, and 
consequently that the only morally responsible intellectual possibility is to produce endlessly 
expanding banal lists of difference: peoples, pop bands, potatoes. And under the democratic-materialist 
heading for the body C we naturally also, aesthetically rather than (obviously) politically, find the 
insistence, in the art market, that art’s function is essentially to shock – but not in a truly shocking way, 
only in a way that will demonstrate the moral superiority of the middle-class consumers of it. In the 
proclamation of this transcendent body the democratic materialists attempt to drown out any Leftists 
who might say that Emin’s art is trash, or that the poor of the West or the rest of the world can find an 
escape route by expanding their minds beyond the narrow cultural experiences they have been exposed 
to. An internal Other myself, I have nevertheless more than once (by a member of the class that 
historically subjugated my own within my own country) been accused of ‘imperialism’ for having such 
a heretical thought in the democratic-materialist world. Once more we can use a Badiouian matheme to 
summarize the formal structure of this occultation, one which, at its (sadly common) worst, is shrouded 
in a holier-than-thou sententiousness that threatens to chase politically valuable study of the Western 
canon – and its focus on the centuries-long unfolding of the project of emancipatory modernity – into 
oblivion. 
C [democratic materialism]⇒(¬ε [no antagonism]⇒¬c [no non-mass art]) 
————————————————————————– 
π [modernist art as ideology critique] 
(4.6) 
Could there be anything more distasteful than the comfortable bourgeois who wears the clothes and 
listens to the music of the poor, while living in perfect material security in Highgate, sending his or her 
children to a high performing local state school whose catchment area prevents the poor 
from attending, and pointing an accusing finger at new members of their class, escapees from poverty, 
who want to open up rather than restrict access to the emancipatory potential of humankind’s greatest 
intellectual and artistic products? For the last and longest rhetorical question of the chapter I 
reserve my most thunderous and angry no. 
A truly Leftist, even communist, musicology extends the emancipatory potential of modernism – in its 
faithful and reactive forms – to all, not just to the congenital middle classes who have benefited from it 
and now, under the conditions of postmodern late capitalism, wish to discountenance it for the sake of 
adopting unreflective multicultural attitudes that are calculated to demonstrate their superior difference 
from the lower classes. Yet as we have seen, even their obscure subjective response is motivated, albeit 
negatively, by the eternal communist present that the third sequence of communism will resurrect for a 
new day. What remains is to discern some of the signs of this resurrection, which can be seized on even 
in reactionary music – to reveal the political potential of musical works that have traditionally been 
seen to be regressive.’ 
(pp. 186-196) 
  
[74] Henry Stobart, ‘Flourishing Horns and Enchanted Tubers: Music and Potatoes in 
Highland Bolivia’, British Journal of Ethnomusicology 3 (1994): 35–48, 
doi:10.1080/09681229408567224. 
[75] Pop musicology falls foul of the presumption of authenticity too: for a critique see 
Elizabeth Eva Leach, ‘Vicars of “Wannabe”: Authenticity and the Spice Girls’, Popular Music 20, no. 
2 (2001): 134–67, doi:10.1017/S0261143001001386. The particular form that this error takes in studies 
of the Western canon is of course in its focus on the authority of the composer. The difference here is, 
however, that that authenticity is not then taken to extend across the entire range of performers, 
listeners, and writers who engage with the music. The classic critique of this is Richard Taruskin, ‘The 
Poietic Fallacy’, Musical Times 145, no. 1886 (2004): 7–34, doi:10.2307/4149092. 
[76] Stobart, ‘Flourishing Horns and Enchanted Tubers’, 35. 
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imposing one’s own values on to the Other’ (ibid., 263). 
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213, doi:10.1017/S026114300000502X. 
[88] Martin Stokes, The Arabesk Debate: Music and Musicians in Modern Turkey, Oxford Studies 
in Social and Cultural Anthropology (Oxford and New York: Clarendon Press, 1992), 108. 
[89] Ibid., 1. 
[90] Stokes, ‘Islam, the Turkish State and Arabesk’, 215. 
[91] Ibid., 217. 
[92] Ibid. This is treated at length in Stokes, The Arabesk Debate. At the same time as they 
objected, the Turkish state broadcasters of course paradoxically promoted arabesk singers when it 
suited the capitalist ideology of the state: ‘The lifestyles of the stars, often described in 
promotional material as the Kings, Queens, Princes and Princesses of arabesk, suggest possibilities of 
social mobility which are quite unrealistic for most of the population, and obfuscate the processes 
of class stratification which are continuing to emerge in modern Turkey’ (ibid., 221). 
  
From ‘Afterword: what to do?’ 
‘The ideological frame of modern musicology, democratic materialism, is seldom brought into the 
clearing. The revolution of the ‘new musicology’ has bequeathed a proliferating collection of 
subdisciplines, all of which inevitably vie for position, most of them picking the easy target of ‘elitist’, 
‘Eurocentric’, faithful modernism. I share many of my colleagues’ suspicion of the masculinism 
of some of this music’s champions but am concerned by the political risk posed by attacks on it – and 
through it, in scholarship on pop music, film music, and particularly ethnomusicology, an attack on 
Western art music as a whole. Even among musicologists who still work on Western art music there is 
a tendency to equate canonicity of the major composers of the first two communist sequences 
(Beethoven, Wagner, the faithful modernists, et al.) with political configurations in the twentieth 
century’s second communist sequence – essentially, ‘totalitarianism’ understood in the broadest terms. 
All attacks on this tradition share the banality of the democratic-materialist mantra: there are only 
bodies and languages, there is no truth. According to ethnomusicology, the cultures of the non-Western 
world should take intellectual precedence, and those of us who spend our time focusing on 
Western music should feel ashamed of ourselves (there is quite an irony in the fact that 
ethnomusicology, in the UK at least, increasingly attempts to colonize the Western-music syllabuses of 
our universities); according to pop or film-music scholarship, the ‘democratic’ (read: successfully 
marketized) forms of music should be examined as a way of valorizing the economically 
underprivileged (the problem here, as I explained in Chapter 4, is the facile judgement that 
such listeners have an essential bond with this music, which cannot be broken, and from which they 
can certainly never dissent); while according to scholars of the Western ‘periphery’, including Britain, 
Scandinavia, and Russia, there is a danger – sometimes baldly stated as a Nazi danger – of 
Germanophilia in perpetuating the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century musical canon, and so on. 
The banality inheres in the conclusion of the mantra: there is no truth. Of course I defend the interests 
of scholars, musicians, and listeners in all of these traditions, and no ethically responsible musicology 
could ever sideline or – which is what many people seem to fear – hope to obliterate them: it 
goes without saying, and therefore need not be said, that the different bodies and languages of the 
world require fair treatment. But failing to give that fair treatment is precisely the danger that faithful 
and reactive modernism protects us from, and which these intellectual approaches I have just 
enumerated – in the form of the obscure subject – are at a particular risk of falling into.1 I have 
absolutely no desire to reduce the quantity of research published in any of these fields, but as they 
come increasingly to dominate the discipline it is vital that a strong and politically radical response 
comes from scholars of modernism. I strongly suggest that modernism continues to offer the best 
scholarly locus for an emancipatory musicology to develop, though I am delighted when, as in Stokes’s 
work (cited in Chapter 4), I see it elsewhere. 
The neoliberal global economic system may be in its last phase. Its ideology has forced its tentacles 
into the heart of the universities, the home of those minds – students and their teachers – that are 
capable of formulating a principled and effective resistance. Academic departments are closing in 
the UK at an alarming rate and academic research is being pushed into ever more narrowly conceived 
furrows of ideologically approved ‘impact’. Academics understandably  flick jaundiced eyes at the 
craven managers who increasingly run universities as businesses, exploiting intellectual property for 
profit’s sake and imposing a neoliberal quilting point in which students show up as consumers 
and degrees as commodities that can be sold for better jobs. But it is not only the managers who are 
colluding with the democratic materialist ideology that threatens the preservation of the commons – the 
ideology is vibrant in much of the universities’ scholarship too.’ 
(pp. 251-252) 
  
From Aijaz Ahmad, ‘Orientalism and After: Ambivalence and Metropolitan Location in the Work of 
Edward Said’, in In Theory: Nations, Classes, Literatures (London: Verso, 1992). 
For in one range of formulations, Said’s denunciations of the whole of Western civilization is as 
extreme and uncompromising as Foucault’s denunciations of the Western episteme or Derrida’s 
denunciations of the transhistorical Logos; nothing, nothing at all, exists outside epistemic Power, 
logocentric Thought, Orientalist Discourse- no classes, no gender, not even history; no site of 
resistance, no accumulated projects of human liberation, since all is Repetition with Difference, all is 
corruption – specifically Western corruption – and Orientalism always remains the same, only more so 
with the linear accumulations of time. The Manichaean edge of these visions – Derridean, Foucauldian, 
Saidian – is quite worthy of Nietzsche himself. 
But this vision, in the case of Orientalism, gains further authority from the way it panders to the most 
sentimental, the most extreme forms of Third-Worldist nationalism. The book says nothing, of course, 
about any fault of our own, but anything we ourselves could remember – the bloodbath we conducted 
at the time of Partition, let us say – simply pales in comparison with this other Power which has 
victimized us and inferiorized us for two thousand five hundred years or more. So uncompromising 
is this book in its Third-Worldist passion that Marxism itself, which has historically given such 
sustenance to so many of the anti-imperialist movements of our time, can be dismissed, breezily, as a 
child of Orientalism and an accomplice of British colonialism. How comforting such visions of one’s 
own primal and permanent innocence are one can well imagine, because given what actually goes on in 
our countries, we do need a great deal of comforting. 
 
But it was-not within the so-called ‘Third World’ that the book first appeared. Its global authority is in 
fact inseparable from the authority of those in the dominant sectors of the metropolitan intelligentsia 
who first bestowed upon it the status of a modern classic; while, perhaps paradoxically, its most 
passionate following in the metropolitan countries is within those sectors of the university intelligentsia 
which either originate in the ethnic minorities or affiliate themselves ideologically with the 
academic sections of those minorities. In Chapter 2 above, I discussed the connection between the 
emergence of the category ‘Third World Literature’ and the key changes that occurred in the patterns 
of immigration from the late 1960s onwards, with substantial numbers of Asian immigrants 
being based now among the petty-bourgeois and techno-managerial strata. Those who came as 
graduate students and then joined the faculties, especially in the Humanities and the Social Sciences, 
tended to come from upper classes in their home countries. In the process of relocating themselves in 
the metropolitan countries, they needed documents of their assertion, proof that they had always been 
oppressed. Books that connected oppression with class were not very useful, because they neither came 
from the working class nor were intending to join that class in their new country. Those who said that 
majority of the populations in Africa and Asia certainly suffered from colonialism, but that there were 
also those who benefited from it, were useless, because many of the new professionals who were part 
of this immigration themselves came from those other families, those other classes, which had been the 
beneficiaries; Said would pose this question of the beneficiaries of colonialism in very peculiar ways in 
his invocation of Ranajit Guha, as we shall soon see. 
 
Among critiques that needed to be jettisoned, or at least greatly modified, were the Marxist ones, 
because Marxists had this habit of speaking about classes, even in Asia and Africa. What the upwardly 
mobile professionals in this new immigration needed were narratives of oppression that would get them 
preferential treatment, reserved jobs, higher salaries in the social position they already occupied: 
namely, as middle-class professionals, mostly male. For such purposes Orientalism was the 
perfect narrative. When, only slightly later, enough women found themselves in that same position, the 
category of the ‘Third World female subaltern’ was found highly serviceable. I might add that this 
latter category is probably not very usable inside India, but the kind of 
discourse Orientalism assembles certainly has its uses. Communalism, for example, can now be laid 
entirely at the doors of Orientalism and colonial construction; caste itself can be portrayed as a 
fabrication primarily of the Population Surveys and Census Reports- Ronald Inden literally does this, 
32 and Professor Partha Chatterjee seems poised to do so .. 33 Colonialism is now held responsible nor 
only for its own cruelties but, conveniently enough, for ours too. Meanwhile, within the metropolitan 
countries, the emphasis on immigration was continually to strengthen. I have written on one aspect of it 
in relation to Salman Rushdie, but it is worth mentioning that the same theme surfaces with very major 
emphases in Said’s latest essays, with far-reaching consequences for his own earlier positions, as we 
shall see. 
 
The perspectives inaugurated in Orientalism served, in the social self-consciousness 
and professional assertion of the middle-class immigrant and the ‘ethnic’ intellectual, roughly the same 
function as the theoretical category of ‘Third World Literature’, arising at roughly the same time, 
was also to serve. One in fact presumed the other, and between the two the circle was neatly closed. 
If Orientalism was devoted to demonstrating the bad faith and imperial oppression of all European 
knowledges, beyond time and history, ‘Third World Literature’ was to be the narrative of 
authenticity, the counter-canon of truth, good faith, liberation itself. Like the bad faith of European 
knowledge, the counter-canon of ‘Third World Literature’ had no boundaries – neither of space nor of 
time, of culture nor of class; a Senegalese novel, a Chinese short story, a song from medieval India, 
could all be read into the same archive: it was all ‘Third World’. Marx was an ‘Orientalist’ because he 
was European, but a Tagore novel, patently canonical and hegemonizing inside the Indian cultural 
context, could be taught in the syllabi of ‘Third World Literature’ as a marginal, non-canonical text, 
counterposed against ‘Europe’. The homogenizing sweep was evident in both cases, and if cultural 
nationalism was the overtly flaunted insignia, invocation of ‘race’ was barely below the surface – 
not just with respect to the United States, which would be logical, but with reference to human history 
as such. Thus, if ‘Orientalism’ was initially posited as something .of an original ontological flaw in the 
European psyche, Said was eventually to declare: ‘in the relationship between the ruler and the ruled in 
the imperial or colonial or racial sense, race takes precedence over both class and gender I have always 
felt that the problem of emphasis and relative importance took precedence over the need to establish 
one’s feminist credentials.’34 That contemptuous phrase, ‘establish one’s feminist credentials’, takes 
care of gender quite definitively, as imperialism itself is collapsed into a ‘racial sense’. In a 
Nietzschean world, virtually anything is possible. 
(pp. 195-197). 
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Studies in History vol. 7, no. 1, (New Delhi 1991) for detailed comments on Ronald lnden’s 
Imagining India (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991). 
[33] See Panha Chatterjee, ‘Caste and Subaltern Consciousness’, in Ranjic Guha, ed., 
Subaltern Studies, vol. VI (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989). 
[34] ‘Media, Margins and Modernity: Raymond Williams and Edward Said’, Appendix to 
Raymond Williams, The Politics of Modernism: Against the New Conformists, (London: Verso, 
1989), pp. 196-7 The transcript of that public discussion- and, indeed, the whole book ends on that 
sentence about ‘feminist credentials’ 
 
